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ABSTRACT—Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the procedures
necessary for corporations to reorganize. To ensure that the bankruptcy
process and proposed reorganization plan are fair, Chapter 11 mandates
that certain requirements are met before confirmation of a reorganization
plan can be achieved. Section 1129(a)(10) represents one of those
requirements. Specifically, § 1129(a)(10) requires at least one impaired
class of claims to vote in favor of the reorganization plan in order for it to
be confirmed. Applying § 1129(a)(10) is relatively simple in bankruptcy
proceedings involving a single debtor; however, its application is much
more complicated in bankruptcy proceedings involving multiple debtors.
As multi-debtor bankruptcy proceedings have become increasingly
common, courts have begun to debate whether § 1129(a)(10) requires an
impaired class from each debtor to vote in favor of a proposed
reorganization plan in a jointly administered, multi-debtor Chapter 11
proceeding, or whether it requires only one impaired class from across all
debtors to vote in favor of it. The former option is known as the
“per-debtor” approach, and the latter as the “per-plan” approach. This
Comment argues for the adoption of the per-debtor approach. In particular,
it urges that the per-debtor approach more accurately aligns with the plain
meaning and statutory construction of Chapter 11, more closely follows the
purpose and underlying safeguards at work within the Bankruptcy Code,
and better serves the interests and rights of the parties involved.
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INTRODUCTION
The global economic crisis over the last several years has served as a
stark reminder of the central role federal bankruptcy law plays in today’s
corporate world. Although the number of corporate bankruptcy filings fell
in the last two years, 1 2012 and 2013 still observed several large
bankruptcies, including Eastman Kodak, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
Publishers, and Hostess Brands. 2 These large bankruptcy proceedings
underscore the importance of federal bankruptcy law as well as the
frequency with which bankruptcy law affects business.3
U.S. bankruptcy law is designed to benefit both debtors and creditors.
Debtors emerge from bankruptcy with a fresh start, and creditors recover a
portion, if not all, of their investments.4 Bankruptcy is meant to provide
1

Adam Belz, Bankruptcy Filings Drop to Lowest Levels Since 2008, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis),
Nov. 8, 2012, at D1; Bankruptcy Filings Drop 12 Percent in Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 24,
2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/bankruptcy-filings-drop-12-percent-fiscal-year-2013 (noting that for the
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2013, bankruptcy filings were down 12% from fiscal year
2012).
2
Tom Hals, U.S. Bankruptcies on Pace to Fall to Pre-2008 Level, REUTERS, Jul. 5, 2012, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-bankruptcy-stats-decline-idUSBRE8640UB20120705.
3
See Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year (1980–2012), AM. BANKR. INST.,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=65139&TEMPLATE
=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (presenting bankruptcy filing statistics by year
from 1980 to 2012).
4
See Daniel R. Wong, Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting a Contract
Rate Approach, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1927, 1928 (2012); see also Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,
236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (finding that the purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide debtors with a
fresh start); Michael Bentley Guss, Comment, Ohio v. Kovacs: The Conflict Between Federal
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debtors with a single forum in which they can quickly and efficiently sort
out their affairs. 5 The reality, however, is that many bankruptcies result in
lengthy and expensive litigation.6
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code addresses corporate
reorganizations. It requires a bankrupt firm to create a plan of
reorganization that restructures the financial claims against it so that it may
continue operating as a going concern. 7 Under a reorganization plan,
similar claims to the firm’s assets are grouped into classes based on certain
claim characteristics, such as priority. 8 The plan must propose a treatment
for each class—that is, identify what each class will receive in return for
their prebankruptcy claims. 9 If the plan alters a class’s legal, equitable, or
contractual rights, then that class is considered impaired. 10 Once proposed,
a reorganization plan can be confirmed in two ways: consensually, if all
classes have accepted the plan; 11 or nonconsensually, over the dissent of an
impaired class if all of the Bankruptcy Code’s requirements under
§ 1129(a) have been met, except for § 1129(a)(8). 12 Nonconsensual
confirmation is generally referred to as a “cramdown.” 13
Because Chapter 11 proceedings are often large and complex, courts
have allowed certain administrative rules of convenience to be used to
facilitate the management of these proceedings. Joint administration and
substantive consolidation are two of these rules. Joint administration allows
closely related debtors, such as subsidiaries and affiliated companies, to file
joint bankruptcy petitions. 14 By moving for joint administration, all closely
related debtors are able to have their bankruptcy petitions administered by

Bankruptcy Laws and State Environmental Regulations, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1985) (“[T]he
creditors will receive at least part of the debt owed to them.”).
5
See Wong, supra note 4, at 1928–29.
6
See id. at 1929. The average Chapter 11 proceeding lasts more than two years with estimated
direct costs of approximately 6.5% of the debtor’s book value of assets. See Edith S. Hotchkiss et al.,
Bankruptcy and the Resolution of Financial Distress, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL CORPORATE
FINANCE 235, 260, 262 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008).
7
See Hotchkiss et al., supra note 6, at 242.
8
See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012) (“[A] plan may place a claim or an interest in a
particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of
such class.”).
9
See Hotchkiss et al., supra note 6, at 242.
10
See § 1124(1); In re PPI Enters., 324 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Each creditor has a set of
legal, equitable, and contractual rights that may or may not be affected by bankruptcy. If the debtor’s
Chapter 11 reorganization plan does not leave the creditor’s rights entirely ‘unaltered,’ the creditor’s
claim will be labeled as impaired under § 1124(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
11
See § 1129(a). Any class that is not impaired is deemed to have accepted the plan. See § 1126(f).
12
See § 1129(b); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 320 B.R. 523, 532 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
13
See Armstrong, 320 B.R. at 532; Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward
Removing Artificial Limits on Chapter 11 Claim Classification, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 2 (1995).
14
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015.
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the same court. 15 In theory, joint administration does not alter the
Bankruptcy Code’s requirements in any way—each debtor’s estate is still
considered separate and distinct.16 Substantive consolidation, in contrast,
allows a bankruptcy court to combine the estates of multiple debtors and to
force each debtor’s creditors to become creditors in a consolidated estate.17
Unlike joint administration, substantive consolidation does alter the
Bankruptcy Code’s requirements. 18
Although both rules promote efficiency in bankruptcy proceedings,
each serves a distinct purpose. This distinction, however, has become
blurred in the context of § 1129(a)(10). Section 1129(a)(10), one of the
requirements for confirming a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, provides
that “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the [proposed reorganization]
plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan [must have]
accepted the plan.” 19 Generally, § 1129(a)(10)’s requirement is simple: Did
at least one impaired class under the debtor’s proposed reorganization plan
vote in favor of it? If so, then § 1129(a)(10) is satisfied. When joint
administration and substantive consolidation are used, however, the
application of § 1129(a)(10) becomes less clear. Because joint
administration inevitably involves multiple debtors, the underlying
difficulty with § 1129(a)(10) is this: Does § 1129(a)(10) require an
impaired class from each debtor involved in the jointly administered
Chapter 11 proceeding to vote in favor of the proposed plan, or does it
require only one impaired class from across all debtors to vote in favor of
the plan? The former option is known as the “per-debtor” approach, and the
latter as the “per-plan” approach.20
As the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware noted in In re
Tribune Co., the lack of clarity surrounding the appropriate interpretation
of § 1129(a)(10) has led courts to differing interpretations in jointly
administered proceedings, with some courts adopting the per-debtor
approach and others adopting the per-plan approach. 21 This disparity is
significant because a court’s interpretation of this provision can have a
substantial impact on how Chapter 11 reorganization plans are negotiated
15

See id. Advisory Committee’s Notes.
See Bunker v. Peyton (In re Bunker), 312 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Joint administration
does not affect the substantive rights of either the debtor or his or her creditors.”).
17
See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005).
18
See Timothy E. Graulich, Substantive Consolidation—A Post-Modern Trend, 14 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 527, 527 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“As a consequence [of substantive consolidation],
claimants can no longer recover on their claims from their original obligors; rather, claimants recover
their ratable share of a common ‘hotchpot’ consisting of the combined assets of the consolidated
entities.”).
19
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
20
See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 180 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R.
208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
21
Id. at 180–82.
16
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and structured. Traditionally, proposed reorganization plans for jointly
administered Chapter 11 proceedings contain just one plan for all debtors.
However, if each debtor is required to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) in its own
right, as is required by the per-debtor approach, then this structure no
longer works. Debtors will instead be forced to restructure their proposed
plans to account for each debtor’s individual creditors.
Likewise, this judicial determination of whether to apply the perdebtor or per-plan approach can also have a serious impact on the
availability of plan confirmation through a cramdown. A cramdown refers
to a court’s ability to confirm a plan proponent’s, or a debtor-inpossession’s, 22 proposed plan of reorganization over a creditor’s
objection. 23 It is a “powerful remedy available to plan proponents.” 24
Section 1129(a)(10) is an important safeguard for creditors because it
requires some measure of support from impaired creditors before a plan can
be confirmed over their objections. 25 If a per-debtor approach is used, then
each debtor must obtain the consent of an impaired creditor. If a per-plan
approach is used, however, then a single consenting impaired class can
provide the necessary vote to enable the cramdown of a plan on all
creditors who have claims not just against that impaired class’s debtor, but
also against all other debtors involved in the jointly administered
bankruptcy proceeding. This is a dramatic result, particularly given the
important role voting plays in Chapter 11 proceedings. An impaired
creditor’s vote is its most powerful tool during bankruptcy, and adopting a
per-plan approach discredits the value of that vote. This makes clarity
regarding § 1129(a)(10) quite valuable.
Because the In re Tribune Co. decision only recently shed light on and
challenged the application of § 1129(a)(10) in jointly administered Chapter
11 proceedings, very little has been written about this issue. 26 This
Comment helps fill that void. After reviewing relevant case law and the
underlying rationale for the two approaches, this Comment argues for the
adoption of the per-debtor approach. The per-debtor approach accurately
22

A debtor automatically assumes the “debtor in possession” identity once it files a voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter 11, or, in an involuntary case, once an order for relief has been entered.
§ 1101(1). A debtor-in-possession retains possession of its assets while in Chapter 11. This debtor-inpossession status continues until a reorganization plan is confirmed, the bankruptcy case is dismissed or
converted, or a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed. See § 1104(a) (discussing the limited circumstances in
which a trustee can be appointed to manage the debtor’s affairs); id. §§ 1107–08 (discussing the rights
and powers of the debtor-in-possession).
23
A bankruptcy court receives its cramdown powers from Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See
§ 1129(b)(1).
24
See In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 147 B.R. 827
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
25
See, e.g., Michael Chaisanguanthum, Charter: The Most Important Recent Bankruptcy Decision
for Secured Creditors, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 9, 14 (2010).
26
For a discussion of these issues, see id.

1359

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

aligns with the statutory construction of Chapter 11, more closely follows
the purpose and underlying safeguards implied within the Bankruptcy Code
than the per-plan approach does (particularly in regard to cramdowns), and
better serves the interests and rights of the parties involved. Adopting the
per-debtor approach would also provide greater predictability and fairness
to Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings by clearly indicating to parties their
respective rights.
Part I of this Comment reviews the background of bankruptcy courts,
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and § 1129(a)(10). Part II discusses relevant case
law and illustrates how the debate over the proper interpretation of
§ 1129(a)(10) has developed. Part III argues for the adoption of the perdebtor approach.
I. UNDERSTANDING CHAPTER 11 AND § 1129(a)(10)
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to
“establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States.” 27 Using this power, Congress created a federal bankruptcy
system. In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978), which completely overhauled prior federal
bankruptcy law. 28 When drafting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Congress recognized that resuscitating failing companies is often beneficial
to society, which is why the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 put greater
emphasis on ensuring debtors received a fresh start after exiting
bankruptcy. 29 It also provided debtors with a single forum in which they
could sort out their affairs: the bankruptcy court. 30 Commonly referred to as
the “Bankruptcy Code,” this piece of legislation continues to govern all
bankruptcy cases in the United States today. 31

27

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11 and 28 U.S.C.). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat.
544 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1–1255 (1976)). The previous major revision of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840.
29
As stated by the Report of the House Judiciary Committee, “[T]he bill continues to recognize the
States’ interest in regulating credit within the States, but enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh
start.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087. Providing a
fresh start for a debtor after bankruptcy involves “releasing the debtor from further collection attempts
by creditors and allowing the debtor to retain certain property necessary for [its] return to a normal
life.” John W. Draskovic, United States v. Security Industrial Bank: A Final Determination of the
Retrospectivity of Section 522(f)(2), 10 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 573, 573 (1983).
30
BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 41 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007).
31
See Wong, supra note 4, at 1931.
28
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is further recognized for its
creation of a robust business reorganization section: Chapter 11.32 Chapter
11 outlines the procedures necessary for businesses to reorganize. It
attempts to “strike a balance between the need of a corporate debtor in
financial hardship to be made economically sound and the desire to
preserve creditors’ and stockholders’ existing legal rights to the greatest
extent possible.” 33 Put more simply, Chapter 11 is designed to benefit both
debtors and creditors by providing relief to debtors and protection to
creditors. 34 Embodied within Chapter 11 is the policy that “it is generally
preferable to enable a debtor to continue to operate and to reorganize or sell
its business as a going concern rather than simply to liquidate a troubled
business.” 35 This policy, which again emphasizes the resuscitation of
businesses, assumes that the continued operation of a bankrupt business
generates greater value than liquidation. 36 The primary goal of any Chapter
11 case is to confirm a reorganization plan that will enable the bankrupt
company to emerge with a new capital structure, to return to profitability,
and to eliminate the debt overhang problem that initially forced it into
bankruptcy. 37
32

See id.; see also Richard M. Cieri, et al., “The Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to
Confirm a Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part I), 3 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 3, 3 (1993) (“Chapter 11 reorganization has become one of the most valuable sanctuaries ever
available to businesses facing seemingly insurmountable financial and legal problems.”).
33
7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Edward H. Levi & James Wm. Moore, Bankruptcy and
Reorganization: A Survey of Changes. III, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 398, 405 (1938) (“The problem of
reorganization is primarily a problem of how a failing debtor may be made economically sound and at
the same time the rights, insofar as they exist, of the creditors and stockholders be preserved under a
fair arrangement.”).
34
This differs from prior bankruptcy law, which focused primarily on creditor recovery as opposed
to debtor relief. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States,
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995) (discussing the history of bankruptcy laws in the United States
and how the debtor and creditor rights changed over time).
35
7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 33, ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4; see also Wong, supra note 4,
at 1931. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, unlike in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the business ceases operations
and sells all of its assets. The proceeds are then distributed to its creditors with any residual amount
returned to shareholders and owners. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 700.01, at 700-2 (Alan N.
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013). A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is known as a liquidation
bankruptcy and is used when an individual or corporation is unable to continue as a going concern.
36
See Wong, supra note 4, at 1931–32; see also Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 4–5 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“A Congressionally favored alternative to liquidating a business, . . . Chapter
11 contemplates . . . that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated
business than if sold for scrap.”).
37
See Wong, supra note 4, at 1932; see also Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[S]uccessful completion of the reorganization process allows
a debtor, burdened with the weight of oppressive indebtedness, to restructure its financial obligations,
discharge its pre-existing debt, and emerge from bankruptcy with a new capital structure that better
reflects financial reality.”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co. (In re
Prudential Lines Inc.), 928 F.2d. 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] paramount and important goal of
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A. Confirmation of a Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11
Chapter 11 requires the creation and confirmation of a plan of
reorganization. A plan of reorganization operates as a contract between the
debtor, its creditors, and its equity holders. 38 Section 1123(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code outlines the various components that must be included in
a reorganization plan.39 It is purposefully limited to seven items. By
limiting the number of components required in a plan of reorganization,
Congress ensured that Chapter 11 would remain flexible and capable of
accommodating many different types of arrangements. 40 This flexibility is
also designed to “foster[] meaningful negotiations between management,
creditors, and stockholders regarding the terms of any plan.” 41
Once a plan of reorganization is proposed, the plan proponent
(generally, the debtor-in-possession or its trustee) must solicit creditor
approval. 42 Creditors indicate their approval or disapproval of a proposed
reorganization plan by voting. 43 Although all creditors are technically able
to vote, in practice only impaired creditors actually exercise their right to
vote because unimpaired creditors are presumed to have voted in favor of
the proposed reorganization plan. 44 An impaired creditor’s right to vote is
its most powerful tool in the bankruptcy process. 45 It is its bargaining chip
Chapter 11 is the rehabilitation of the debtor by offering breathing space and an opportunity to
rehabilitate its business and eventually generate revenue.” (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 121 B.R. 428, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 923 F.2d. 26 (2d
Cir. 1991))).
38
In re Pettibone Corp., 134 B.R. 349, 351–52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (“A plan of reorganization is
a contract which binds a debtor and its creditors.”); In re Mako, Inc., 120 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. E.D.
Okla. 1990) (“A Chapter 11 Plan . . . is . . . a contract between a debtor and the creditors of the
bankruptcy estate.”).
39
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (2012) (requiring only seven items be included in a plan). Under the
Bankruptcy Code, a reorganization plan must determine “the classes that are not impaired; identify
treatment for the classes established; treat all class members identically; provide a means for its
implementation; not require the issuance of nonvoting equity securities; and be consistent with the
interests of creditors, equity holders, and public policy in the manner by which the reorganized debtor’s
officers and directors are selected.” See Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5.
40
Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5.
41
Id.
42
To solicit creditor votes, a plan proponent must distribute ballots, certain required notices, and a
disclosure statement approved by a court. Alan N. Resnick, Subordination Agreement Provisions
Shifting Chapter 11 Voting Rights: Can the Seniors Disenfranchise the Juniors?, 118 BANKING L.J.
297, 299 (2001) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)).
43
Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5.
44
See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (2012).
45
The Bankruptcy Code’s rigorous disclosure requirements “emphasize the importance of the
voting process.” See Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5. For example, § 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
requires the plan proponent (generally, the debtor) to achieve court approval of a disclosure statement
that contains “adequate information” before soliciting creditor votes on a proposed reorganization plan.
See § 1125. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code requires that “sufficient information about the debtor’s
financial condition and the anticipated effect of the proposed [reorganization] plan must be
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at the negotiating table, and it represents a creditor’s only opportunity to
stop a plan of reorganization from being pushed through the bankruptcy
process.
A plan can be confirmed in two ways. The most commonly used
method to confirm a plan of reorganization is consensual confirmation,
which requires a plan proponent to obtain the consent of each class of
claims. 46 Section 1129(a) sets forth the requirements for consensual
confirmation. 47 Although unanimous consent from each class of claims is
required for consensual confirmation, not all creditors or interested parties
must support a proposed plan of reorganization for it be confirmed.48
Chapter 11 requires that creditors be grouped into classes based on certain
characteristics of their claims. 49 If a majority of the creditors in a class
approve of the proposed plan, then that class is deemed to have accepted
the plan. 50 This remains true regardless of whether there are any recalcitrant
creditors within that class. Although this requirement may at first glance
seem harsh to creditors, in actuality it is not as harsh as it initially appears.
Because Chapter 11 requires claims to be substantially similar in order to
be classified together, 51 plan proponents are still required to obtain the
approval of a majority of that recalcitrant creditor’s similarly situated
fellow class members before it can push its plan through.
If a plan proponent is unable to achieve consensual confirmation, it
may still be able to achieve confirmation through the Bankruptcy Code’s
“cramdown” process, which represents the second way a plan can be
confirmed. Section 1129(b) sets forth the requirements for a cramdown. A
cramdown permits a plan to be confirmed over the objections of one or
more classes of impaired claims. 52 In other words, it allows a plan to be
confirmed even if § 1129(a)(8), which requires all impaired classes to
accept the plan, has not been satisfied. With the exception of § 1128(a)(8),
however, the remaining requirements outlined in § 1129(a) must still be
disseminated to enable creditors and interest holders to make an informed choice whether to accept or
reject the plan.” Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5–6.
46
See Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement,
60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 69 (1986).
47
See § 1129(a). Most bankruptcy courts have adopted a literalist approach to determining whether
the requirements of § 1129(a) have been met, meaning if a proposed reorganization plan fails to meet
any of the requirements outlined in § 1129(a), courts will not confirm it. See Cieri et al., supra note 32,
at 11. Certain courts have even expressed the view that “the provisions of Chapter 11 require[] [them]
to discharge [their] ‘mandatory independent duty’ to decide whether the plan of reorganization
complied with each of the requirements for confirmation prior to approving the plan.” Id. (quoting In re
MCorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 225 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992), appeal dismissed, 139 B.R. 820 (S.D.
Tex. 1992)).
48
Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 5.
49
See § 1122(a).
50
See id. § 1126(c).
51
See id. § 1122(a).
52
See Booth, supra note 46, at 69.
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met before a cramdown will be permitted under § 1129(b). 53 Cramdown
also requires that a plan be “fair and equitable” and not unfairly
discriminate against dissenting creditor classes.54 Because confirmation of a
plan by cramdown often involves complex valuation issues and
uncertainties, it is generally more advantageous for creditors and interested
parties to work together on the terms of a proposed reorganization plan and
to reach a consensual settlement rather than to try to rely on the cramdown
process under § 1129(b). 55
B. Section 1129(a)(10)
Section 1129(a)(10) is one of the requirements that must be met in
order for a reorganization plan to be confirmed under Chapter 11. It states
that “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class of
claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan.” 56 Section
1129(a)(10), at a minimum, requires one impaired class of claims to vote in
favor of the reorganization plan before it can be confirmed. 57
Congress specifically added this requirement in 1978 when it
overhauled the Bankruptcy Code, and it did so in part to encourage
consensus in the reorganization process among interested parties.58
Following the 1978 changes, courts began to disagree over whether the
accepting class had to be impaired to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) or whether an
unimpaired class would be enough. 59 This disagreement caused Congress to
act a second time in 1984, to clarify that only an impaired accepting class
would be sufficient. 60 Section 1129(a)(10) now serves as an important
protective measure for creditors by requiring the plan proponent, which is
typically the debtor, to obtain the support of at least some creditors whose
claims are affected by the plan before it can achieve confirmation.61 Section

53

Id.
§ 1129(b).
55
See Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 6.
56
§ 1129(a)(10). Insiders are excluded from this determination. Id.
57
A claim is impaired under the code unless the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and
contractual rights to which [the] claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest.” Id.
§ 1124(1).
58
See Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial Classification
or Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281, 311–13 (1992) (explaining that 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(10) was added in 1978, and that Congress, in 1984, made explicit the requirement that the
accepting class be an impaired class).
59
See id.
60
See Richard M. Cieri, et al., “The Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to Confirm a Plan of
Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part II), 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 115, 146–
47 (1994); Meltzer, supra note 58, at 311–13.
61
See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14. Congress’s exclusion of the “insider” vote in
satisfying § 1129(a)(10) further supports the idea that this section plays a protective function in
cramdowns.
54
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1129(a)(10) also operates as a powerful safeguard for creditors. It protects
creditors from the debtor, who enjoys significant exclusivity and control
advantages throughout the plan process, 62 and it protects creditors from a
plan proponent’s use of the cramdown powers granted by § 1129(b). 63 Even
in a cramdown, § 1129(a)(10) must still be satisfied. Thus, regardless of
how confirmation is obtained, § 1129(a)(10) plays a critical role in the
confirmation process by protecting creditors’ interests and by serving as an
important creditor counterbalance against what is often a very powerful
debtor.
C. Distinguishing Joint Administration from Substantive Consolidation
Joint administration and substantive consolidation are two frequently
used administrative rules of convenience in Chapter 11 proceedings.
Because Chapter 11 petitions are often filed by large corporations, which
own numerous affiliated entities, today’s bankruptcy proceedings tend to
be very complex. When these large corporations file under Chapter 11,
each affiliated entity is required to file a separate bankruptcy petition and to
have its own Chapter 11 case.64 Administrative rules of convenience, like
joint administration and substantive consolidation, allow the parties and the
court to combine the related cases in specific ways to eliminate some of
these complexities and to ease the administrative burden on the parties
throughout the bankruptcy process.
Joint administration allows multiple related cases—such as the cases
of a debtor and its subsidiaries—to be consolidated and placed on a single
docket. 65 It does not substantively abridge the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code in any way, meaning it does not alter creditors’ rights or
the bankruptcy estate of each debtor.66 Instead, it merely serves as a tool of

62
Id. For example, after a Chapter 11 petition is filed, the debtor is given the exclusive right to
propose a plan of reorganization for the first 120 days. See § 1121(b) (“[O]nly the debtor may file a
plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”).
63
See Cieri et al., supra note 60, at 147 n.178 (citing In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Section 1129(a)(10) operates as a statutory gatekeeper barring access to cram
down where there is absent even one impaired class accepting the plan.”), aff’d, 147 B.R. 827
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)); see also Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14 (footnote omitted) (“The intention of
Congress was to reverse cases before the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, where cramdown was permitted
without any consent of creditors.”).
64
Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 18.
65
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015 Advisory Committee’s Notes (“Joint administration as distinguished
from consolidation may include combining the estates by using a single docket for the matters occurring
in the administration, including the listing of filed claims, the combining of notices to creditors of the
different estates, and the joint handling of other purely administrative matters that may aid in expediting
the cases and rendering the process less costly.” (emphasis added)).
66
See, e.g., Bunker v. Peyton (In re Bunker), 312 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Joint
administration does not affect the substantive rights of either the debtor or his or her creditors.”).
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convenience that helps expedite cases and lower administrative costs.67 The
estates of each debtor remain separate and distinct, and creditors are able to
reach only the assets of the specific debtor with which they have a claim.
Substantive consolidation, by contrast, does substantively abridge the
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code and, more importantly, the rights of
the parties involved. 68 Substantive consolidation is not provided for in the
Bankruptcy Code, but is instead a federal common law construct that
emanates from equity. 69 It allows a bankruptcy court to combine the estates
of multiple debtors—each of which are separate legal entities—to pool the
debtors’ assets, and to force each debtor’s creditors to become creditors in
the consolidated estate.70 In essence, it morphs separate creditor claims
against separate debtors into claims against a single surviving entity. 71
When implemented, substantive consolidation significantly affects
creditors’ rights in the bankruptcy process and often prejudices creditors by
causing them to recover less than they would have absent consolidation.72
For example, if the estate of a debtor with a higher asset-to-debt ratio is
substantively consolidated with the estate of a debtor with a lower ratio,
then the creditors of the former debtor will receive less in the combined
bankruptcy proceeding than they would have in an unconsolidated
proceeding. 73 In this way, substantive consolidation, unlike joint
administration, restructures and substantively abridges the requirements of
the Bankruptcy Code and creditors’ rights.
This distinction between joint administration and substantive
consolidation is important not only because the bankruptcy courts have
relied on these means of consolidation to apply § 1129(a)(10) in multidebtor Chapter 11 cases, but also because the correct interpretation of
§ 1129(a)(10) depends on whether either or both are being used in a
bankruptcy proceeding.

67

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015 Advisory Committee’s Notes; see also Chaisanguanthum, supra
note 25, at 18 (“Joint administration is a tool of convenience. For example, if there are fifteen entities, it
obviates the need to file the same motion fifteen times.”).
68
In re I.R.C.C., Inc., 105 B.R. 237, 238 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Joint administration is
distinguished from substantive consolidation because it is simply a procedural consolidation designed
for administrative convenience and does not affect the substantive rights of the creditors of the different
estates.”); In re Farmers & Feeders, Inc., No. 93-30770, 1994 WL 1887489, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.D. Jan.
10, 1994) (“The basic and most significant difference between substantive consolidation and joint
administration is that joint administration does not affect the substantive rights of creditors and other
interested parties since the estate of each debtor remains separate and distinct.” (emphasis omitted)).
69
See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005).
70
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Substantive consolidation . . . treats separate legal
entities as if they were merged into a single survivor left with all the cumulative assets and
liabilities . . . .”).
71
See In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 402 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 2005).
72
See Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 205.
73
See In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
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II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: CONTRASTING VIEWS OF § 1129(a)(10)
There exists limited legal precedent on whether § 1129(a)(10)
demands a “per-debtor” or “per-plan” approach; to date, only a few
bankruptcy courts have addressed the issue. This Part details the current
state of the law by first discussing those cases applying the per-debtor
approach and then discussing those cases applying the per-plan approach.
A. The Per-Debtor Approach
The first court to formally discuss and adopt the per-debtor approach
to § 1129(a)(10) was the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware in its 2011 In re Tribune Co. decision.74 In In re Tribune Co., two
competing jointly administered reorganization plans were proposed, neither
of which received the affirmative vote of an impaired class for each debtor
entity included in the joint plan.75 Because the parties had agreed only to
joint administration and not substantive consolidation, the bankruptcy court
was forced to determine whether § 1129(a)(10) required each debtor that
was part of a joint plan to have at least one class of impaired creditors vote
to accept the plan, or only one impaired accepting class for all of the
debtors subject to the joint plan of reorganization. 76
The court first looked to the statutory construction of § 1129(a)(10). 77
The court considered the effect of the Bankruptcy Code’s own statutory
rules of construction, 78 specifically § 102(7) 79 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which states that “the singular includes the plural.” 80 Under this rule, the
court concluded that § 1129(a)(10)’s reference to “plan” in the singular was
not, on its own, a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that any less than
all debtors must satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a) in a multi-debtor
case. 81 The court also analyzed § 1129(a)(10) in context,82 concluding that
because § 1129 included many plan confirmation requirements that had to
be satisfied by each debtor—e.g., § 1129(a)(7) (best interests of creditors
test), § 1129(b) (cramdown), § 1129(a)(3) (good faith requirement)—so too
did § 1129(a)(10). 83

74

464 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
This case is especially important given the large number of federal Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases that are
filed in the District of Delaware.
75
Id. at 180.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 182.
78
Id.
79
See 11 U.S.C. § 102(7) (2012).
80
Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 183.
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Turning to the substance of the competing plans, the court determined
that because both plans failed to provide for substantive consolidation84 of
the debtors, each joint plan actually “consist[ed] of a separate plan for each
Debtor.” 85 The court distinguished its case from prior cases where a perplan approach was adopted, such as In re SGPA, Inc. 86 and In re Enron
Corp., 87 on substantive consolidation grounds. 88
The court held that each debtor participating in a multi-debtor, jointly
administered plan of reorganization must satisfy § 1129(a)(10) unless all of
the debtors are substantively consolidated under the joint plan.89
Shortly after deciding In re Tribune Co., the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court reaffirmed its per-debtor interpretation in In re JER/Jameson Mezz
Borrower II, LLC (In re JER/Jameson). 90 There, JER/Jameson Mezz
Borrower II, LLC (Mezz II) filed for Chapter 11 protection the day before
its sole creditor, Colony, was to participate in a foreclosure auction.91 At
the foreclosure auction, Colony intended to sell its only asset: Mezz II’s
membership interest in Mezz I. 92
Colony, the sole creditor, sought to dismiss Mezz II’s bankruptcy case
for bad faith, stating that it was “a litigation tactic designed to forestall its
efforts to foreclose on its collateral.” 93 Colony also argued that Mezz II had
no rehabilitation prospects as a going concern because the entity had no
active operations or direct employees. 94
Relying on In re Tribune Co., the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the
case. 95 The judge agreed with Colony that there was no realistic chance of
reorganization because no plan of reorganization could be confirmed absent
Colony’s consent. 96 The judge reasoned that because substantive
consolidation was absent, Mezz II would need at least one impaired
consenting class to confirm a plan; 97 but, because Colony was the sole

84

See supra Part I.C for a discussion on substantive consolidation.
Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182.
86
No. 1-01-02609, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2001). See infra Part II.B
for discussion of this case.
87
No. 01-16034, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004). See infra Part II.B for
discussion of this case.
88
Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 181.
89
Id. at 183.
90
461 B.R. 293 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
91
Id. at 300.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 299, 301.
95
Id. at 302, 308.
96
Id. at 302.
97
Id.
85
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creditor entitled to vote on the plan, no other impaired consenting creditors
existed. 98 Mezz II needed Colony’s consent for confirmation.
Collectively, In re Tribune Co. and In re JER/Jameson stand for the
proposition that, absent substantive consolidation or consent, each debtor
involved in a jointly administered plan must separately satisfy
§ 1129(a)(10).
B. The Per-Plan Approach
The earliest case cited in support of the per-plan interpretation of
§ 1129(a)(10) is the 2001 decision In re SGPA, Inc. by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 99 SGPA and ten of its
subsidiaries and affiliates filed Chapter 11 petitions.100 The eleven debtors
agreed to joint administration but not substantive consolidation.101 After the
debtors proposed a reorganization plan, the subordinated bondholders
involved in the case—who were an impaired class under the proposed
plan—filed an objection to confirmation in which they argued for the
adoption of the per-debtor approach. Under the bondholders’ interpretation,
the proposed plan would not be confirmable because only one of the eleven
debtors had received the necessary vote from an impaired class.102
The court overruled the bondholders’ objection, finding that “in a joint
plan of reorganization it is not necessary to have an impaired class of
creditors of each Debtor vote to accept the Plan.” 103 The court noted that
“[w]hether these Debtors were substantively consolidated or jointly
administered would have no adverse [effect] on the Subordinated
Bondholders.” 104 Accordingly, the court rejected the bondholders’
argument and held that the reorganization plan complied with
§ 1129(a)(10) because “at least one class of impaired creditors . . . accepted
the Plan.” 105
Although some courts view In re SGPA, Inc. as having adopted the
per-plan interpretation solely because the result would have been the same
if the parties had agreed to substantive consolidation, the language of the
decision is unclear on whether or not this was the primary driving factor in
its decision. Because the court did not focus on this issue, In re SGPA, Inc.

98

Id.
No. 1-01-02609, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2001).
100
Id. at *1.
101
Id. at *9–10.
102
Id. at *13.
103
Id. at *21.
104
Id. at *22 (emphasis omitted).
105
Id.
99
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more strongly supports the per-plan interpretation than it does the perdebtor interpretation.106
In 2004, a few years after In re SGPA, Inc. was decided, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York similarly decided
in In re Enron Corp. that § 1129(a)(10) could be satisfied on a per-plan
basis. 107 There, 177 different debtors had filed Chapter 11 petitions.108
However, unlike In re SGPA, Inc., the debtors had agreed to both joint
administration and substantive consolidation.109
The court began by considering the plain meaning of the statute.110
Relying on In re SGPA, Inc., the court found that “[t]he plain language and
inherent fundamental policy behind § 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides that an affirmative vote of one impaired class under a plan is
sufficient to satisfy § 1129(a)(10).” 111
The court also found that the parties’ agreement to substantively
consolidate supported the per-plan interpretation of § 1129(a)(10). 112 The
court stated, “[T]he requirements of section 1129(a)(10) are satisfied as to
each of the Debtors lacking an impaired accepting class because those
Debtors are part of the global compromise [i.e., are substantively
consolidated] embodied in the Plan.” 113
Thus, in reaching its conclusion that a per-plan approach satisfied the
requirement of § 1129(a)(10), the court relied on both the plain language of
the statute as well as the fact that the debtors had agreed to both joint
administration and substantive consolidation of their Chapter 11
proceedings. As discussed below, use of the per-plan approach in
circumstances like those presented in In re Enron Corp., where the parties
agree in advance to substantively consolidate, is acceptable because the
parties have consented to the alteration of their substantive rights and
effectively eliminated the threat typically posed by the adoption of the perplan approach—disenfranchisement of an impaired creditor’s right to vote
without that creditor’s consent.
In its next case, however, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York expanded its In re Enron Corp. ruling well beyond
acceptable limits. In In re Charter Communications, the Bankruptcy Court
106

For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Tribune Co. distinguished In re SGPA, Inc. on this
fact. In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 182 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 208
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
107
In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2549, at *234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15,
2004).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at *234–35.
111
Id. at *235.
112
Id.
113
Id.
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for the Southern District of New York not only reaffirmed its view that
§ 1129(a)(10) can be satisfied on a per-plan basis, but also expanded its
application to all jointly administered cases even in the absence of
substantive consolidation. 114 Like in In re SGPA, Inc., the debtors had
agreed to joint administration of their Chapter 11 proceedings but not
substantive consolidation. 115
The court relied on In re Enron Corp. and In re SGPA, Inc. in reaching
its conclusion that “it is appropriate to test compliance with section
1129(a)(10) on a per-plan basis, not, as the . . . Noteholders argue, on a perdebtor basis.” 116 The court indicated that because the debtors had agreed to
joint administration, only one impaired accepting class was necessary to
satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a)(10). 117 The court ultimately found that
regardless of whether the debtors had agreed to substantive consolidation,
§ 1129(a)(10) allowed a per-plan interpretation when plans were jointly
administered.
Although largely viewed as dicta,118 this decision is significant because
it indicates that the per-plan interpretation is applicable to all jointly
administered Chapter 11 proceedings regardless of whether the parties
agree to substantive consolidation. The court viewed agreement to joint
administration as sufficient to alter the rights of the creditors, a holding that
stands in contrast to In re Tribune Co. and In re JER/Jameson.
The most recent case to consider how to interpret § 1129(a)(10) is In
re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc. 119 There, the court explicitly rejected
In re Tribune Co.’s analysis and instead adopted the per-plan interpretation
articulated in In re SGPA, Inc. and In re Enron Corp. 120 To distinguish the
case from In re Tribune Co., the In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc.
judge primarily relied on factual distinctions, 121 noting that even if In re
Tribune Co. were correct on its facts, its analysis did not work in this
instance because In re Transwest Resort Properties Inc. only had one
proposed plan for all debtors, whereas In re Tribune Co. had separate
proposed plans for each debtor. 122 The judge also indicated that even
114

JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Charter Commc’ns (In re Charter Commc’ns), 419 B.R. 221, 266
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 182 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 208
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011); Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 19.
119
See Transcript of Record, In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., No. 10-37134 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
Dec. 19, 2011) (court’s ruling on the record confirming third amended and restated joint plan of
reorganization). This is the only case to have ruled on this issue subsequent to In re Tribune Co. and In
re JER/Jameson.
120
See id. at 5.
121
See id.
122
See id. at 6–7.
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though the parties did not explicitly agree to substantive consolidation, the
result in this case, like in In re SGPA, Inc., would be the same even if they
had, meaning the creditors would have been no worse had substantive
consolidation been adopted. 123 Accordingly, the judge determined that the
per-plan approach was appropriate and that the requirements of
§ 1129(a)(10) “are met by having at least one impaired class vote for the
plan.” 124
In sum, the few courts that have interpreted § 1129(a)(10) in this
regard have adopted divergent approaches. In re SGPA, Inc. and its
progeny focused on the presence (or deemed presence) of substantive
consolidation and statutory history to determine that § 1129(a)(10) should
be interpreted on a per-plan basis. In re Charter Communications found the
presence of joint administration alone to be sufficient to allow
§ 1129(a)(10) to be applied on a per-plan basis. In re Tribune Co. also
focused on the statutory history and broad purpose of § 1129(a)(10) but
came to the opposite conclusion, holding that § 1129(a)(10) should be
interpreted on a per-debtor basis absent a strict directive of substantive
consolidation. Such divergent approaches call for clarity in this area.
III. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
Courts should resolve the confusion surrounding the application of
§ 1129(a)(10) by adopting the per-debtor approach outlined in In re
Tribune Co. In jointly administered (but not substantively consolidated)
Chapter 11 proceedings, § 1129(a)(10) should be satisfied only if at least
one impaired class of claims under each debtor votes to accept the
proposed reorganization plan. In contrast, if the parties agree to substantive
consolidation, then the per-plan interpretation should be used because the
parties will have effectively agreed to combine their estates and to accept
an alteration of their rights.
This Part discusses why the per-debtor approach is the better
interpretation. Part III.A illustrates why the per-debtor interpretation more
accurately aligns with the statutory construction of Chapter 11. Part III.B
argues that the per-debtor approach is preferable for two reasons: first, it
better aligns with the Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown procedures, and
second, it ensures that the principles of substantive consolidation and joint
administration are not conflated. Finally, Part III.C discusses the
implications of adopting a per-debtor approach.

123
124
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A. Statutory Construction of the Bankruptcy Code Supports the
Per-Debtor Interpretation
When analyzing statutory language, a thorough analysis requires
examination of the plain meaning of the statute as well as the larger context
of the relevant statutory language. 125 Here, close examination ultimately
supports adopting a per-debtor interpretation of § 1129(a)(10).
Section 102 of the Bankruptcy Code outlines relevant rules of
construction to be used throughout the Code for interpreting statutory
language. 126 Relevant here is § 102(7), which provides that “the singular
includes the plural.” 127 Section 1129(a)(10) states, “If a class of claims is
impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under
the plan has accepted the plan . . . .” 128 Section 1129(a)(10) requires at least
one class of impaired claims under a plan to approve the plan before it can
be confirmed.
Using the § 102(7) rule of construction, the In re Tribune Co. court
found that § 1129(a)(10)’s reference to “plan” in the singular was an
insufficient basis upon which “to conclude that, in a multiple debtor case,
only one debtor—or any number fewer than all debtors—must satisfy
[§ 1129(a)(10)’s] standard.” 129 In multiple debtor cases that are jointly
administered, but not substantively consolidated, the substantive rights of
the parties are not altered (or at least are not supposed to be). 130 Joint
administration merely allows related debtors to work out their
reorganizations in a single proceeding. Each debtor remains a separate
entity, and its creditors’ claims remain entirely distinct from the claims of
other debtors’ creditors. The practical effect of not being substantively
consolidated is that “each joint plan actually consists of a separate plan for
each [d]ebtor.” 131 The ability to pluralize “plan” under § 102(7) directly
supports this view, indicating that § 1129(a)(10)’s requirement
encompasses more than just approval for a singular plan. Even if a single
plan is proposed for all debtors, as occurred in In re Transwest Resort
Properties, Inc., the result should not change when substantive
125
See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 183 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R.
208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011); see also, e.g., Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted) (“The starting point in statutory interpretation is the language of the
statute itself. . . . The strong presumption that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional
intent is rebutted only in rare and exceptional circumstances.”).
126
See 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
127
Id. § 102(7). When adding § 102(7) to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress clarified that it was a
necessary addition to the Rules of Construction because the Bankruptcy Code “uses only the singular,
even when the item in question most often is found in plural quantities.” See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at
316 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273.
128
§ 1129(a)(10).
129
Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182.
130
See supra Part I.C.
131
Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182.
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consolidation is absent. If separate plans did not exist for each debtor in a
jointly administered proceeding then the substantive rights of the parties
would undoubtedly be altered, for one impaired class of creditors would be
able to speak for another impaired class of creditors with claims against an
entirely different debtor. Because a creditor’s ability to vote is its most
powerful substantive right, eliminating this right by reading plan singularly
in the absence of substantive consolidation would effectively mute that
creditor. To avoid this result, § 1129(a)(10) must be read, as § 102(7)
allows it to be, to require the use of the per-debtor approach.
Courts should also perform a contextual, in pari materia analysis of
§ 1129(a)(10), as the court in In re Tribune Co. did. 132 The per-debtor
interpretation receives even greater support from reading § 1129(a)(10) in
conjunction with the other subsections of § 1129(a) than it does from
analyzing the plain meaning of the section on its own. 133 First, consider
§ 1129(a)(1), which requires that the reorganization plan comply with the
applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 134 It is well established that
§ 1129(a)(1) cannot be satisfied if not all debtors meet it, even in jointly
administered bankruptcy proceedings. 135 Likewise, § 1129(a)(3), which
requires that the plan be proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law, cannot be satisfied if not all debtors meet it.136 These
sections illustrate a consistent principle of application: all debtors must
meet each requirement under § 1129(a). Applying this principle to
§ 1129(a)(10) would likewise require all debtors to meet it, meaning a perdebtor approach would be the correct interpretation.
Section 1129(a)(7) provides further guidance, particularly given its
focus on the interests of impaired creditors. Section 1129(a)(7) embodies
the “best interest of creditors” test, which addresses the treatment—what
each class of claimants will receive in exchange for their pre-bankruptcy
claims—required for “each impaired class” 137 of creditors. The best interest
132
See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (citation omitted) (stating that a
“cardinal rule” of statutory construction is that “a statute is to be read as a whole, since the meaning of
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context”); Crédit Agricole Corporate & Inv. Bank v. Am.
Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc. (In re Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc.), 637 F.3d 246, 255 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Supreme Court has indicated a reluctance to
declare provisions of the Bankruptcy Code ambiguous . . . . [C]ourts [should] not be guided by a single
sentence . . . , but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”).
133
Section 1129(a) outlines the requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.
134
Specifically, § 1129(a)(1) states, “The court shall confirm a plan only if [the] plan complies
with the applicable provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1) (2012).
135
See Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 183.
136
See id.
137
§ 1129(a)(7); In re Draiman, 450 B.R. 777, 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Section 1129(a)(7)
provides that each holder of an impaired claim who has rejected a plan must ‘receive or retain under the
plan on account of such claim . . . property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less
than the amount that such holder would so receive . . . if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . .
on such date.’” (quoting § 1129(a)(7))).
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of creditors test requires that, with respect to each impaired class of claims,
each holder of a claim has accepted the plan or will receive or retain
property that is worth at least as much as the impaired class of claims
would have received if the debtor were liquidated. 138 For the analysis of
§ 1129(a)(10), the most important fact is that the test applies to each
individual creditor holding impaired claims, regardless of whether the class
as a whole voted to accept the plan. 139 Section 1129(a)(7) thus “cannot be
read fairly other than as an entitlement to the prescribed treatment for every
impaired class of creditors for each debtor [that] is part of a joint plan.” 140
This again signals the Bankruptcy Code’s focus on each individual debtor,
rather than on the debtors as a whole. 141
For all of these reasons, under a strict statutory analysis, the per-debtor
interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) is better than the per-plan interpretation
because it more closely aligns with the Bankruptcy Code’s rules of
construction and the other confirmation conditions outlined in § 1129(a).
B. The Per-Debtor Approach as the Preferable Method
The per-debtor approach is preferable to the per-plan approach
because it preserves § 1129(a)(10)’s role as a protective measure against
abuse of a cramdown when substantive consolidation is absent, and also
because it ensures substantive consolidation and joint administration are
not conflated.
1. Section 1129(a)(10) as a Safeguard Against Abusive
Cramdown.—A cramdown is a powerful remedy available to plan
proponents and is arguably one of “the most significant and probable
risk[s]” creditors face in Chapter 11. 142 A cramdown, which is detailed in

138

See Cieri et al., supra note 32, at 49.
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 441 n.13
(1999) (“Section 1129(a)(7) provides that if the holder of a claim impaired under a plan of
reorganization has not accepted the plan, then such holder must ‘receive . . . on account of such
claim . . . property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that
such holder would so receive . . . if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . . on such date.’ The
‘best interests’ test applies to individual creditors holding impaired claims, even if the class as a whole
votes to accept the plan.” (quoting § 1129(a)(7))).
140
Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 183.
141
The remainder of the requirements under § 1129(a) are boilerplate or inapplicable. Section
1129(a)(2) is a boilerplate provision, as are § 1129(a)(4)–(5). Section 1129(a)(6) is not discussed
because it “applies only if a regulatory commission has jurisdiction over rates charged by the debtor.”
See Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative,
39 BUS. LAW. 441, 448 (1984). Section 1129(a)(8) applies to each class of claims, which would lend
further support to the use of § 1129(a)(10) under the per-debtor approach, but is not required to be met
in order for a plan to be crammed down. See § 1129(b). Sections 1129(a)(9) and 1129(a)(11) are
likewise inapplicable here.
142
Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 10; see In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 147 B.R. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
139
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§ 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 143 forces confirmation of a
reorganization plan over dissenting classes and forces those dissenting
classes to rely on difficult court judgments, valuations, and
determinations.144 Section 1129(a)(10) serves as a protective mechanism for
creditors in avoiding a cramdown because it requires some measure of
support from impaired creditors, or those whose rights are being altered by
the reorganization plan, in order for a plan proponent’s reorganization plan
to be confirmed. 145 Before a plan proponent is able to force a cramdown
and compel those objecting creditors to “shoulder the risks of error
necessarily associated with a forced confirmation,” § 1129(a)(10) mandates
that the plan proponent obtain the consent of at least one impaired creditor
who would be hurt by the plan.146 This is § 1129(a)(10)’s underlying policy
rationale, and it is important because there are many risks and uncertainties
associated with a cramdown: confusion, delay, valuation, discount rates,
and increased likelihood of liquidation due to adversarial posturing of
parties. 147
Moreover, this underlying policy rationale is exactly what Congress
intended for § 1129(a)(10). In 1984, when Congress amended
§ 1129(a)(10) to clarify that it required the accepting class to be
impaired, 148 it did so in order to reverse the cases that had occurred prior to
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code in which cramdowns were permitted without
the consent of any creditor. 149 The legislative history indicates that creditor
consent, specifically impaired creditor consent, is a critical component to a
successful Chapter 11 reorganization. This requirement appropriately

143
See § 1129(b); ADLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 707 (“Section 1129(b) is invoked when a
reorganization plan fails to garner the acceptance of all impaired classes of claims . . . and thus fails to
satisfy § 1129(a)(8).”). For a detailed discussion of § 1129(b), see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 33, ¶ 1129.03, at 1129-63.
144
See 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. at 287.
145
See id.; Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14.
146
266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. at 287; see also In re Anderson Oaks (Phase I) Ltd. P’ship, 77
B.R. 108, 112–13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) (“[T]here must be some one other than the debtor, other
than the insiders, and other than the target of the cram down, who cares enough about the reorganization
and whose rights must also be considered to invoke the equitable grounds that justify resort to cram
down.”).
147
266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. at 287; see Booth, supra note 46, at 104–05. Booth also notes that
“[a]ll of these risks and uncertainties may be avoided if the parties avert a cramdown. . . . [I]n most
chapter 11 cases, it will be in the best interest of all the parties to reach a settlement and to consent to a
plan under section 1129(a), rather than to resort to a cramdown under section 1129(b).” Booth, supra
note 46, at 104-05.
148
Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14; see also Cieri et al., supra note 60, at 146–47; Meltzer,
supra note 58, at 311–13.
149
See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 14 (citing 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 33,
¶ 1129.LH[7], at 1129-204).
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balances the interests of both the debtor and the creditor, which is a key
foundational principle underlying all bankruptcy proceedings. 150
If § 1129(a)(10)’s approval requirement is interpreted as per-plan in
the absence of substantive consolidation, then its ability to safeguard
creditors involved in joint plans of reorganization from a cramdown is for
all practical purposes eliminated. Plan proponents—whether the debtor or
creditors—could easily manipulate the proposed reorganization plan and
ensure claims were classified in a way that would guarantee at least one
impaired class from at least one debtor voted in favor of the plan.151 For
example, a plan proponent could intentionally try to misclassify one or
more claims, 152 or isolate a secured creditor’s large deficiency claim into its
own class so another impaired class of unsecured claims could vote in
favor of the plan if the large deficiency claim does not. 153 Likewise, a plan
proponent could try to distribute lower payments to a class of unsecured
creditors than the estate is otherwise capable of paying in order to create an
“impaired” class. 154
If a plan proponent may structure the claims in a way that enables it to
obtain the affirmative vote of at least one impaired class, then under a perplan interpretation, this vote would be sufficient to satisfy § 1129(a)(10)
and allow the cramdown of the proposed plan on the remaining creditors,
regardless of how they voted. 155 In effect, this result allows an impaired
creditor class from Debtor A to dictate the rights, values, and reorganization
plan structure not only for the remaining creditors of Debtor A, but also for
the creditors of Debtor B, Debtor C, Debtor D, and so on. Admittedly, even
under the per-debtor approach a single impaired class is able to dictate the
structure of a reorganization plan for all other impaired creditor classes
under that single debtor. However, while this may be the reality of a
cramdown for the creditors of a single debtor, adopting the per-plan
approach for § 1129(a)(10) would exasperate that already alarming reality.
The impaired creditors under the other debtors involved in the joint plan
would lose substantive rights (most importantly, the value of their vote) in
the bankruptcy process and essentially be stripped of their § 1129(a)(10)
safeguard. Adoption of the per-plan approach for § 1129(a)(10) would also
150

See id.
This is particularly true given the unclear law surrounding artificial claims classifications. See
Markell, supra note 13 (providing a historical and analytical analysis of claim classification under
Chapter 11); Susan E. Trent & Mark A. Warsco, Buying Votes in Chapter 11, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J.
38 (2011).
152
See 94 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 36 (2007).
153
See 3 BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE: FORECLOSURE WORKOUTS
PROCEDURES § 29:58 (2006). Courts remain split over whether classifying claims in this way is
acceptable or a bad faith classification by the debtor. Id.
154
See 94 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 36.
155
Cramdown can be particularly detrimental to secured lenders who are forced to risk “receiving
debt-like compensation for taking equity-like risk.” See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 11.
151
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effectively override any decision by the parties involved in the bankruptcy
proceeding against substantive consolidation by forcing it upon the parties
without any consideration of the balance of equities, as is normally
required in order for substantive consolidation to be implemented. Courts
must not disregard these rights or the practical effects that would result by
choosing to adopt the per-plan approach instead of the per-debtor approach.
Likewise, plan proponents can take advantage of the classification
requirements under Chapter 11 to ensure § 1129(a)(10) is met. When
classifying creditors, the Bankruptcy Code dictates in § 1122(a) that
similarly situated creditors must be treated equally in a proposed plan of
reorganization. 156 However, many courts have interpreted this portion of the
Code to effectively disenfranchise creditors who could otherwise block
confirmation with a dissenting vote. 157 Courts do this by reading the second
portion of § 1122(a) to require only that claims classified together be
substantially similar, not that all similarly situated claims be classified
together. 158 The result is that plan proponents are able to artificially
gerrymander classes, so long as those claims that are actually classified
together remain substantially similar, to ensure that at least one impaired
class votes in favor of the plan in order to satisfy the requirements of
§ 1129(a)(10). Because classes of claims must separately vote on whether
to accept or reject a plan of reorganization, how claims are classified
directly affects the integrity of the Chapter 11 voting process.159 When
coupled with a per-plan interpretation, this ability to artificially impair
claim classification—which occurs at the plan proponent’s discretion as
creditors have no say unless they are the plan proponent—becomes much
more powerful because plan proponents need only manipulate the classes
for one debtor, rather than all debtors, to undermine the voting rights of all
creditors in the case under Chapter 11.
If § 1129(a)(10) is instead interpreted on a per-debtor basis,
Congress’s intention to provide creditors with additional protection from
cramdowns would be better served. Returning to the above example, under
a per-debtor approach, the impaired class of Debtor A that voted in favor of
the proposed plan would satisfy § 1129(a)(10) only in regard to Debtor A.
The remaining debtors (e.g., Debtor B, Debtor C, and Debtor D) would
each need their own impaired class of claims—assuming there were
impaired classes—to vote in favor of the proposed plan in order for each of
the debtors to meet § 1129(a)(10)’s requirement. This result ensures that all
creditors retain their voting rights in the Chapter 11 proceeding regardless
of whether they are involved in a jointly administered plan.
156

11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012); see also Meltzer, supra note 58, at 290.
Meltzer, supra note 58, at 290.
158
Id.
159
See In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 282 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 147 B.R. 827
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
157
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Overall, the per-debtor approach better protects the rights of creditors
by ensuring that at least one impaired creditor from each debtor approves
the proposed reorganization plan. 160 If an agreement between debtor and
creditor cannot be reached, then the debtor should not be allowed to cram
down its desired plan of reorganization on creditors without clearing the
necessary protective hurdles—one of which is substantive consolidation,
another of which is supposed to be § 1129(a)(10). Neither substantive
consolidation nor § 1129(a)(10) would retain its power under a per-plan
interpretation. If no impaired creditors agree to the plan, a debtor should
not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of a confirmation through cramdown
by forcing acceptance upon the dissenting creditors.161 A lack of an
accepting impaired class indicates that “the debtor has failed to negotiate
effectively with its creditors [while] devising a reorganization plan.”162
Ineffective negotiation should not be rewarded by a per-plan interpretation
of § 1129(a)(10), particularly when creditors are facing the potential risks
and consequences of a cramdown.
2. Ensuring Joint Administration Does Not Equate to Substantive
Consolidation.—Requiring that the per-debtor interpretation be
used in jointly administered Chapter 11 proceedings when substantive
consolidation is absent ensures that the corporate form is respected and the
substantive rights of creditors are protected. Joint administration is viewed
as a tool of convenience. 163 It does not abridge the parties’ legal rights.164
This is a well-established principle. Case law resoundingly dictates that
joint administration does not alter substantive rights.165 Substantive
consolidation, in contrast, is an equitable principle that does alter the
substantive rights of the parties. 166
A per-plan interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) in the absence of
substantive consolidation effectively conflates the two principles. It allows
an impaired class of claims for one debtor to speak for the creditors of
another debtor who are situated differently, have different rights and
recoveries, and arguably have diametrically opposed interests. 167 For
160
See In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 835 (W.D. Wis. 1983). This result also closely
aligns with the current trend among federal appellate courts to vindicate creditors’ rights in Chapter 11
proceedings. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2005).
161
Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. at 835 (“[I]t would not be equitable to impose acceptance of [a]
plan upon the creditors by enforcing the debtor’s interest in confirmation of the plan through the
cramdown authority.”).
162
Id.
163
See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 18 (providing an example of the convenience of joint
administration: “[I]f there are fifteen entities, it obviates the need to file the same motion fifteen
times”).
164
See supra Part I.C.
165
See supra Part I.C for further information on substantive consolidation and joint administration.
166
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
167
See Chaisanguanthum, supra note 25, at 19.
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example, creditors of a parent entity receive value through the equity of the
parent entity’s subsidiaries; their interests are undoubtedly in significant
opposition to the interests of the subsidiary’s creditors. 168 Requiring
§ 1129(a)(10) to be met at the individual debtor level in the absence of
substantive consolidation will at a minimum better balance the control the
plan proponent (typically, the debtors) has against the control the creditors
have and provide courts with a more independent measure on valuation
issues, which will allow bankruptcy court judges who are imperfect
adjudicators of value reach a more accurate valuation result.169
Conflating these two concepts, moreover, is particularly troubling
because it alters those creditors’ rights while they are playing what is in
essence a zero-sum game (i.e., all creditors are fighting over a fixed sum):
the bankruptcy estate. 170 Allowing the per-plan approach in jointly
administered proceedings blatantly ignores both the substantive rights of
the creditors and corporate separateness because it effectively combines
separate creditor entities from multiple closely related debtors.171 Adopting
a per-plan interpretation when substantive consolidation is absent—as
occurred in In re Charter Communications and In re Transwest Resort
Properties, Inc. 172—would require precedent to be disregarded and the
difference between joint administration and substantive consolidation to be
ignored. Even if the result would be the same if substantive consolidation
were imposed, as was indicated in In re SGPA, Inc. and In re Transwest
Resort Properties, Inc., courts should not skip the analysis required for
implementing substantive consolidation. It is specifically designed to
ensure that the creditors’ and debtors’ rights are considered and equitably
balanced.
Only by following a per-debtor approach can the corporate form and
substantive rights of the parties involved in the bankruptcy proceeding
remain intact. The per-debtor approach ensures that the creditors of each
debtor (or at least one impaired creditor of each debtor) retain meaningful
protection and a say in how the proposed reorganization plan allocates and
distributes value. This is critical because eliminating the value of an
impaired creditor’s vote during the bankruptcy process in essence purges
from that creditor one of the most important—if not the most important—
benefits it receives from the bankruptcy process, and it does it all for the
benefit of the debtor, who already enjoys tremendous exclusivity and
control advantages.

168

Id. at 20.
Id.
170
Id. (“Allocating enterprise value [in a bankruptcy proceeding] is a zero-sum proposition . . . .”).
171
See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2005).
172
See supra Part II.B for a discussion of In re Charter Communications and In re Transwest
Resort Properties, Inc.
169
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Given the implications a per-plan approach would have on a creditor’s
ability to safeguard itself from a cramdown, as well as its disregard for a
creditor’s substantive rights, it should not be adopted. Instead, courts
should adopt the per-debtor approach, which preserves § 1129(a)(10)’s
safeguarding role—unless the parties agree otherwise through substantive
consolidation—and ensures creditors are able to continue enjoying those
rights granted to them in the bankruptcy process.
3. The Policies and Principles Underlying Chapter 11.—The
policies and principles underlying Chapter 11 support the adoption of the
per-debtor approach. The primary goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcies are to
provide the bankrupt with a fresh start and to maximize the value of the
bankruptcy estate so the highest value of assets is available to creditors.173
The per-debtor approach advances both of these interests.
The per-debtor approach aids the debtor in obtaining that fresh start by
clarifying debtor rights at the start of the Chapter 11 process. If a debtor
believes a per-plan approach is necessary to ensure successful
rehabilitation, then that debtor now knows substantive consolidation must
be formally obtained. Because the substantive consolidation determination
requires a bankruptcy court to analyze the necessity of consolidation for a
successful reorganization and the actual expectations of the parties
involved, the court will be forced to determine whether such an approach is
truly appropriate by balancing the various interests of the affected parties,
including the debtor, its creditors, and its employees. 174 This balancing is a
critical part of the bankruptcy process 175 and something that should be
enforced throughout the substantive consolidation decisionmaking process.
Additionally, by adopting a per-debtor approach, debtors will be able
to more easily manage the bankruptcy process because the formal adoption
of the per-debtor approach eliminates any confusion surrounding the
interpretation of § 1129(a)(10). Although this could also be achieved by
adopting the per-plan approach, the per-plan approach does not accurately
follow the language of § 1129(a)(10) and compromises the explicit
directive of the Bankruptcy Code.
Adopting the per-debtor approach in jointly administered proceedings
also helps maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. It ensures that
173
See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527–28 (1984) (noting that one of the primary
goals of Chapter 11 is the maximization of the value of the bankruptcy estate); 7 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 33, ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4; Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering
Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 417 (1998).
174
See, e.g., Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211 (“In our Court what must be proven (absent consent)
concerning the entities for whom substantive consolidation is sought is that (i) prepetition they
disregarded separateness so significantly their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity borders and
treated them as one legal entity, or (ii) postpetition their assets and liabilities are so scrambled that
separating them is prohibitive and hurts all creditors.”).
175
See Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527.
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debtors with higher asset-to-debt ratios are not combined with debtors that
have lower ratios unless their assets are actually substantively
commingled. 176 The resulting loss from the bankruptcy process, then, is as
minimal as possible. Creditors will face lower asset-to-debt ratios only
when their expectations appropriately support such a result.
C. Implications of Adopting a Per-Debtor Interpretation
Adopting the per-debtor interpretation for § 1129(a)(10) will
inevitably have an impact on how Chapter 11 proceedings are conducted.
For example, because companies today are often structured in complex
ways with many affiliated companies and bankruptcy-remote (special
purpose) entities, the per-debtor approach could prevent these companies
from cramming down a reorganization plan absent substantive
consolidation and make the reorganization process more difficult, costly,
and time consuming. 177 These cost implications, however, are insufficient
on their own to overpower the protection of creditor rights provided by the
per-debtor approach. Corporations filing under Chapter 11 tend to have
more resources—e.g., internal legal and finance departments—that allow
them to obtain a better understanding of the potential risks associated with
the bankruptcy process and with debt.178 Corporations, as debtors, also have
greater control over the bankruptcy process itself, which allows them to
better control and minimize costs throughout the process, particularly as
compared to creditors. As a result, the cost impact is unpersuasive as a
rationale for allowing the per-plan approach to be adopted over the perdebtor approach.
Adopting the per-debtor approach may also cause creditors to object
more frequently to reorganization plans that incorporate a per-plan
scheme. 179 This could cause companies entering bankruptcy to reconsider
the debtors they wish to place in bankruptcy. 180 It may also cause
companies entering bankruptcy to seek substantive consolidation at the
onset of the bankruptcy process to circumvent the per-debtor requirement

176

See Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211.
Gary E. Axelrod et al., New Challenges for Real Estate Restructurings, LAW360 (Sept. 11,
2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/law-360-real-estate-restructurings; see Jared
S. Roach, Jointly Administered Plans Must Obtain Impaired Class Approval ‘Per Debtor’ Rather than
‘Per Plan,’ COM. RESTRUCTURING & BANKR. NEWSL. (Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, P.A.), June 2012,
at 3, available at http://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/5eb8589d-c5b2-48e3-81e9-8533a73b
5bf4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b28e4949-a14d-4e4c-bdd0-9e60915744f2/crab0612%5B1%
5D.pdf.
178
See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 33, ¶ 1129.05[2][c], at 1129-148 (“[The costminimizing] rationale, while not absent from chapter 11 cases, is certainly minimized in larger chapter
11 cases.”).
179
See Axelrod et al., supra note 177.
180
See id.; Roach, supra note 177.
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and effectively impose the per-plan interpretation.181 Requiring companies
to consider substantive consolidation from the beginning is a good thing
because it forces the courts to focus on the best interests of all parties at the
start of the process and it forces the debtor to consider how best to handle
the bankruptcy process.
The per-debtor interpretation will also likely force debtors and plan
proponents to develop new methodologies and negotiating strategies for
obtaining the necessary consent of an impaired voting class. 182 Today,
jointly administered reorganization plans, which are used for the
convenience of the parties, usually propose just one distribution scheme. 183
The structure of that distribution scheme is often designed without regard
for where the debtor’s assets and liabilities are located. 184 This structure
will not be successful under the per-debtor interpretation. However, this
can be easily remedied once debtors (or other plan proponents) know that
the per-debtor approach will be used, because they can adjust the structure
of the plan at the beginning of the bankruptcy process to ensure it
appropriately addresses all parties involved.
Despite any possible negative ramifications, the per-debtor approach is
still preferable over the per-plan approach. As the In re Tribune Co. court
stated, “[C]onvenience alone is not [a] sufficient reason to disturb the rights
of impaired classes of creditors of a debtor not meeting confirmation
standards.” 185 The Bankruptcy Code is designed to benefit both debtors and
creditors. The per-debtor approach better achieves this goal. Assuming the
per-debtor interpretation is adopted, parties will need to focus on consensus
earlier in the process and act more aggressively in attempting to achieve it
in order to overcome the hurdles imposed by § 1129(a)(10). 186 But this
additional effort is not without good cause. The per-debtor approach better
protects the interests of the creditors by more accurately balancing the
distribution of bargaining power between the debtors and the creditors. A
better distribution of power makes the negotiation process more meaningful
and ensures that debtors and creditors work together to reach the best
reorganization solution possible, which is the underlying objective of
Chapter 11. The Bankruptcy Code’s spirit should not be quashed by the
adoption of a per-plan interpretation.
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See Axelrod et al., supra note 177.
See id.; Roach, supra note 177.
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See Axelrod et al., supra note 177. This would be similar to the plan proposed in In re
Transwest Resort Properties, Inc. See Transcript of Record, In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., No. 1037134 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 2011) (court’s ruling on the record confirming third amended and
restated joint plan of reorganization); see also supra Part I.C.
184
See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 183 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), on reconsideration, 464 B.R.
208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
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See id.
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CONCLUSION
This Comment sheds light on the different approaches bankruptcy
courts are using to interpret § 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. Some
courts have adopted a per-plan approach, while others have adopted a perdebtor approach. This lack of consistency in applying § 1129(a)(10) has
left debtors and creditors with unclear legal precedent and a lack of clarity
on how to best structure their reorganization plans. Such uncertainty only
adds to the complexity of Chapter 11 reorganizations and to the time it
takes to complete bankruptcy proceedings.
Adopting the per-debtor approach finds support in several areas. The
per-debtor approach more accurately aligns with the meaning and context
of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, the per-debtor interpretation better
coincides with the other subsections of § 1129(a). The per-debtor approach
also allows § 1129(a)(10) to retain its safeguard mechanism in relation to
cramdowns. This result helps creditors retain the protections granted to
them throughout the bankruptcy process and is more in line with
Congress’s intention in adopting § 1129(a)(10). Finally, the per-debtor
interpretation ensures that two very different legal principles—substantive
consolidation and joint administration—are not conflated and the
substantive rights of creditors disregarded.
The benefits of the per-debtor approach far outweigh the benefits of
the per-plan approach and the costs of implementation. Courts should adopt
the per-debtor interpretation for § 1129(a)(10) when dealing with jointly
administered, but not substantively consolidated, Chapter 11
reorganizations.
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